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TOWARDS A MODERNISATION 
OF EURUSSIA LEGAL RELATIONS? 
ABSTRACT
The legal framework of EU-Russia relations is still determined on the basis of a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that was concluded in 1994 and entered into force on 1 December 
1997. Due to internal developments in both the EU and Russia, several provisions of the agreement 
have become outdated. Russia developed into a market economy and is on the verge of acceding 
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU enlarged to 27 – soon 28 – Member States and 
went through a process of institutional reform. It is argued that in this context, a modernisation 
of EU-Russia legal relations is urgently needed. The options for a new comprehensive framework 
agreement are discussed in light of Russia’s WTO accession and initiatives for regional economic 
integration in the post-Soviet space. 
INTRODUCTION
The Partnership for Modernisation, launched at the 2010 Rostov-on-Don EU-Russia 
summit, is the latest attempt to reinvigorate the so-called ‘Strategic Partnership’ 
between Russia and the European Union.1 It aims to put some fl esh on the bones 
of the rather ambiguous long-term objective to establish four ‘Common Spaces’, 
namely a Common Economic Space, a Common Space of Freedom Security and 
Justice, a Common Space of External Security and a Common Space of Research 
and Education, including Cultural aspects. 2 Both the Partnership for Modernisation 
and the Common Spaces agenda have been adopted in the framework of an 
EU-Russia summit and, therefore, essentially have a political rather than a legal 
signifi cance. As a result, the implementation of the ambitious cooperation agenda 
requires the adoption of binding bilateral agreements and takes place – for the 
time being – within the legal and institutional framework of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). 
1 ‘Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation, EU-Russia Summit, 31 May – 1 June 2010’ 
(2010), http://goo.gl/YBwk3. 
2 The ambition to create four Common Spaces was introduced at the May 2003 Saint-Petersburg 
EU-Russia Summit. The May 2005 Moscow EU-Russia Summit adopted a single package of road maps 
with action points for the implementation of the new agenda. For comments, see: Van Elsuwege, 
P. (2008a), ‘The Four Common Spaces: New Impetus to the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership?’, in 
Dashwood, A. and Maresceau, M. (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations. Salient Features of 
a Changing Landscape, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 334–359. 
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The PCA has been concluded in 1994 and entered into force on 1 December 
1997 for an initial period of ten years. 3 Pursuant to Article 106, the agreement is 
automatically extended each year unless either side informs the other party of 
its denunciation at least six months before the expiry date. Whereas, from a legal 
point of view, the PCA can therefore continue to apply without formal problems, a 
revision of this framework agreement is urgently needed. 
Due to internal developments in both the EU and Russia, several provisions 
have become outdated. The preamble and Article 1, for instance, refer to Russia as 
“a country with an economy in transition”, which is no longer appropriate after the 
recognition of Russia’s market economy status and its (pending) accession to the 
WTO.4 Moreover, the level of bilateral co-operation has gradually extended beyond 
the scope of the PCA. An important weakness in this respect is the relative lack of 
PCA provisions concerning co-operation in the areas of foreign and security policy 
or police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Finally, the EU’s eastern 
enlargement and the further extension of EU competences after the adoption 
of the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties as well as Russia’s more assertive 
foreign policy in the Putin-Medvedev era, have created a new political context for 
EU-Russia co-operation. 
The asymmetrical nature of the PCA, based upon a unilateral adaptation of 
Russian legislation to EU values and norms, is diffi  cult to reconcile with Russia’s 
insistence on ‘equal partnership’. For this reason, the Russian side insisted already 
in 1999 on “the joint elaboration and conclusion of a new framework agreement on 
Strategic Partnership and Co-operation in the 21st century”. 5 Confronted with the limits 
of a unilateral policy towards Russia in the context of the EU enlargement process, all 
EU institutions also recognised the need to revise the legal and strategic framework 
of EU-Russia relations.6 This resulted in the adoption of the four Common Spaces 
agenda – replacing the old unilateral Common Strategy on Russia – and a 
commitment to establish an updated legal framework replacing the PCA. 
3 ‘Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part’ 
(PCA) (1997), Offi  cial Journal of the European Union, L 327/3, http://goo.gl/31ltE. 
4 The WTO ministerial conference approved the accession package on 16 December 2011, allowing 
Russia to fi nally join the WTO by July 2012. See: WTO (2012), ‘Accessions. Russian Federation’, 
http://goo.gl/SXhPQ. 
5 ‘Medium-Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the 
European Union (2000–2010)’, http://goo.gl/VLR4w. 
6 Following the diffi  culties to fi nd an agreement with Russia on the issue of Kaliningrad transit and the 
extension of the PCA to new EU Member States, the December 2003 European Council instructed 
a general revision of “all aspects of the Union’s relations with Russia”. As part of this exercise, all EU 
institutions expressed their dissatisfaction with the at that time existing framework based upon the 
PCA and a unilateral Common Strategy on Russia. On this point, see: Van Elsuwege, P (2008a), op. 
cit., pp. 337–339. 
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The EU and Russia agreed to develop a new, comprehensive framework 
agreement at their May 2006 Sochi meeting. After a series of problems with 
new EU Member States and the military confl ict between Russia and Georgia, 
negotiations offi  cially started at the end of 2008.7 However, this does not mean 
that the conclusion of a new framework agreement is now a mere formality. 
Signifi cant legal obstacles still need to be tackled. Issues such as the legal basis of 
the agreement, the institutional framework, and, foremost, the scope and binding 
nature of the provisions are all of fundamental importance to attain the objective 
of a strengthened EU-Russia Strategic Partnership. 
In order to address the challenges surrounding the modernisation of 
EU-Russia legal relations, this paper starts with a critical analysis of the existing 
legal framework established on the basis of the PCA. In the following section, the 
options for modernising EU-Russia legal relations are discussed taking into account 
the progress in the ongoing negotiations for the conclusion of a new bilateral 
framework agreement. Specifi c attention is devoted to the implications of Russia’s 
accession to the WTO and the recent initiatives for regional trade integration in the 
post-Soviet space. 
THE PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT: 
A LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE PAST 
An Instrument of Transition 
The PCA has be to situated in the specifi c geopolitical and psychological context 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Whereas the EU quickly off ered the prospect 
of ‘association’ and, after the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, also ‘accession’ 
to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), the European Commission 
suggested another type of agreement to Russia and the Newly Independent States 
7 Poland vetoed the planned opening of the negotiations at the November 2006 Helsinki EU-Russia 
summit in response to Russia’s ban on the import of Polish meat. At the following summit meeting, 
held in Samara on 18 May 2007, EU-Russia relations reached an absolute freezing point. A long 
list of tensions and mutual disagreements ranging from the future status of Kosovo, the issue of 
energy supply to the fate of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia implied that, in 
contrast to previous practice, the summit ended without a Joint Declaration. It was only on the 
occasion of the 26–27 June 2008 EU-Russia Summit in Khanty-Mansiysk that a new atmosphere 
in the bilateral relationship could be perceived. This gathering, for the fi rst time chaired by the 
new Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, and organized under the auspices of Slovenia as the fi rst 
new EU Member State to hold the Presidency of the EU, formally launched the negotiations for a 
new Strategic Partnership agreement. Unfortunately, the new enthusiasm quickly received a major 
blow with the outbreak of the confl ict in Georgia in August 2008 and Russia’s unilateral decision 
to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In response, the EU decided at an 
extraordinary European Council meeting to postpone the negotiations on the new partnership 
agreement. However, it soon became clear that a long-term postponement of the negotiations was 
not in the EU’s interest. Accordingly, it was decided to start the negotiations in December 2008.  
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of the former Soviet Union. Accordingly, the concept of ‘Partnership’ has been 
introduced as a label that characterizes the EU’s external relations with a number 
of states which are not considered to be potential EU members but are seen as 
strategically important for the latter. 8 With Russia, a joint political declaration 
on Partnership and Co-operation was issued during Yeltsin’s visit to Brussels in 
December 19939 as a prelude to the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
(PCA) signed in Corfu on June 24, 1994.10 
The preamble of the PCA reveals that the agreement aims to support Russia’s 
political and economic transition. Together with the strengthening of democratic 
values, respect for the rule of law and human rights, the key objective is to assist 
“Russia’s progressive integration in the open international trading system”. In this 
respect, the PCA anticipated on the application of WTO rules and underlines the 
parties’ commitment to liberalise trade on the basis of the principles contained in 
the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (GATT).11 This implies, for instance, the 
application of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle12 and GATT provisions 
on freedom of transit13 and customs valuation, fees and formalities connected 
with importation and exportation, marks of origin and the publication and 
administration of trade regulations.14 Moreover, the Co-operation Council, 
established under the PCA, is held to take into account “to the greatest extent 
possible” the interpretations that are given to the relevant articles of the GATT for 
the interpretation and application of the relevant PCA provisions.15
Whereas the introduction of GATT rules in EU-Russia trade relations may have 
been somewhat revolutionary in the beginning of the 1990s, Russia’s economic 
development and forthcoming accession to the WTO make those provisions 
virtually redundant in the present day reality of EU-Russia cooperation. The situation 
is slightly diff erent with regard to the PCA provisions on trade in services. Even 
though Russia’s commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) largely replicate or exceed the obligations under the PCA, there remain 
certain commitments, notably with regard to international maritime transport 
services and the temporary movement of natural persons for business purposes, 
8 Hillion, C. (1998), ‘Partnership and Co-operation Agreements between the European Union and the 
New Independent States of the ex-Soviet Union’, European Foreign Aff airs Review, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 
400–401.
9 European Commission (1993), ‘Bulletin EC 1993, 12, 1.3.29’.
10 See note 3.
11 PCA, Preamble.
12 PCA, Article 10.   
13 PCA, Article 12. 
14 PCA, Article 13. 
15 PCA, Article 94. 
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where the PCA goes further than the GATS.16 A bilateral agreement in the form 
of an exchange of letters between the EU and the Russian Federation preserves 
the continued application of those more benefi cial market access conditions after 
Russia’s accession to the WTO.17  
Despite the PCA’s clear objective to prepare the integration of Russia in the 
world economy, various provisions limit the scope of the liberalisation process.18 
Trade concessions in ‘sensitive’ sectors such as textiles, coal and steel are left outside 
the scope of the PCA.19 Safeguard clauses allow both parties to take ‘appropriate 
measures’ when domestic products may be threatened by an increased quantity 
of imported products.20 Moreover, the agreement includes general and broadly 
defi ned provisions on economic co-operation,21 but stops short of any regional 
trade integration. Article 3 PCA only foresees that the parties consider “whether 
circumstances allow the beginning of negotiations on the establishment of a free 
trade area”. Like many other provisions of the PCA, this so-called “evolutionary 
clause” is essentially a declaration of intent without any direct legal consequences. 
The general nature of the PCA is particularly well-illustrated with the objective 
to achieve the approximation of Russia’s existing and future legislation to that 
of the EU. While recognising that this process of legislative approximation is an 
important condition for strengthening the economic links between the parties, 
Article 55 (1) of the PCA proclaims that Russia “shall endeavour to ensure that its 
legislation be gradually made compatible with that of the Community [now 
Union]”.22 This can hardly be regarded as a formal legal commitment. Its vague and 
open-ended formulation gives the Russian authorities a large freedom to defi ne 
16 European Commission (2011a), ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the 
European Union, and provisional application of, the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of 
Letters between the European Union and the Russian Federation regarding the preservation of 
commitments on trade in services contained in the current EU-Russia Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement’, COM(2011) 721 fi nal, http://goo.gl/zZT99, p. 2.  
17 ‘Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Government 
of the Russian Federation relating to the preservation of commitments on trade in services 
contained in the current EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’ (2012), Offi  cial Journal 
of the European Union, L 57/44, http://goo.gl/y9yA0.  
18 For a detailed analysis of the trade-related aspects of the PCAs, see: Hillion, C. (1998), op. cit.. 
19 Separate agreements had to be concluded for trade in textile and steel (e.g. Articles 21 and 22 of the 
PCA). Trade in agricultural products is only covered marginally in the title on “economic cooperation” 
(Article 60 of the PCA). Signifi cantly, Russia’s WTO accession will lead to a further liberalisation in 
those sectors (cf. infra).
20 See PCA, Article 17.
21 The title “Economic Cooperation” in the PCA contains provisions on industrial cooperation, 
investment promotion and protection, public procurement, co-operation in the fi eld of standards 
and conformity assessment, education and training, energy, environment, cooperation in science 
and technology, tourism, monetary policy, social cooperation, money laundering, regional 
development, information and communication, statistical cooperation, etc.  
22 Emphasis added. 
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the time-schedule and methods of implementation. There is only an obligation to 
act without a requirement to achieve particular results or a sanction in case the 
approximation of laws obligation is not fulfi lled. Moreover, the approximation 
clause includes a long list of ‘priority areas’ for legislative action23 but fails to provide 
clear guidelines on the scope and content of the EU laws to be taken as the basis 
for approximation nor does it include a link with the objective to establish a Free 
Trade Area in the future.
Also with regard to energy, perhaps the most signifi cant area of EU-Russia 
cooperation, the PCA remains rather vague. Article 65 only provides that 
“[c]ooperation shall take place within the principles of the market economy and the 
European Energy Charter, against a background of the progressive integration of the 
energy markets in Europe.” As is well-known, Russia signed the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT) in 2004 but never ratifi ed the agreement and even decided to withdraw its 
signature in 2009.24 As a result, EU-Russia energy cooperation is essentially based on 
non-legally binding dialogues and commitments. Most important is the EU-Russia 
energy dialogue, which was established at the EU-Russia Paris summit in 2000 and 
aims to create trust and transparency in EU-Russia energy relations through the 
organisation of regular meetings at diff erent political levels. This dialogue inter 
alia resulted in the establishment of an early warning mechanism for preventing 
and overcoming emergency situations in the energy sector25 and a common 
understanding on the preparation of a road map for EU-Russia energy cooperation 
until 2050.26 Both instruments are at best described as ‘soft law’ mechanisms, which 
certainly have their merits but cannot conceal the lack of legally binding norms 
regarding investment protection, transit or dispute resolution.   
Taking into account the rather limited legal consequences of many PCA 
provisions, it has been concluded that “besides its very nice title there is little 
23 Article 55 (2) of the PCA refers to company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, 
protection of workers at the workplace, fi nancial services, rules on competition, public procurement, 
protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, the environment, consumer protection, 
indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, nuclear laws and transport.
24 It is noteworthy that the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague decided in a case between 
the former shareholders of the Yukos Oil Company against Russia that despite the non-ratifi cation 
of the ECT by Russia, the ECT’s investment protection and arbitration provisions remain binding 
on Russia for 20 years. This follows from Article 41(1) of the ECT, which explicitly foresees in such a 
long-term protection in case of provisional application of the agreement. See: ‘PCA Case No. AA 226’ 
(2009), http://goo.gl/BQu5n. 
25 This early warning mechanism was established in 2009 in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis 
and has been updated in 2011. See: ‘Memorandum on a Mechanism for Preventing and Overcoming 
Emergency Situations in the Energy Sector within the Framework of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue’ 
(2011), http://goo.gl/Z8M3M. 
26 ‘Common Understanding on the Preparation of the Roadmap of the EU-Russia Energy Cooperation 
until 2050’ (2011), http://goo.gl/Y3brR. 
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substance in this Agreement”.27 A notable exception is certainly Article 23 of the 
PCA, which provides that the parties shall ensure within their territory the non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality of legally employed workers as far as their 
conditions of employment, remuneration or dismissal are concerned. In its famous 
Simutenkov judgment, the European Court of Justice confi rmed the direct eff ect 
of this principle, which means that it can be relied on by individuals before the 
courts of a Member State.28 Of course, the application of the non-discrimination 
principle does not extend to rules on social security or access to employment. The 
EU Member States remain exclusively competent to determine the conditions for 
entry to their national labour market. It is only when a Russian national is legally 
employed in accordance with the national provisions of the host Member State 
that Article 23 of the PCA can play a role. 
Limits of the EU-Russia Institutional Framework
Perhaps the most important feature of the PCA is the establishment of a regular 
political dialogue within a multilevel institutional framework including bi-annual 
EU-Russia summits, ministerial meetings, diplomatic contacts and Parliamentary 
co-operation. This political dialogue allowed the extension of EU-Russia co-
operation beyond the substantive scope of the PCA provisions themselves. 29 
Moreover, the PCA institutional structures have been instrumental for fi nding 
compromise solutions to EU enlargement related questions such as the transit of 
persons to Kaliningrad or the extension of the PCA to the EU’s new Member States. 30 
Of particular importance for solving bilateral problems in the EU-Russia Strategic 
Partnership is Article 102 of the PCA, which allows the partners “to discuss any 
matter concerning the interpretation or implementation of this agreement and other 
relevant aspects of the relations between the parties” within the PCA institutions. 
The main weakness of the PCA’s institutional framework is, however, the 
absence of a possibility to adopt legally binding decisions. Accordingly, progress 
in EU-Russia relations is essentially based upon the conclusion of specifi c bilateral 
agreements or joint statements with a purely political value. Often, those political 
statements are nothing more than vague diplomatic declarations without 
27 Maresceau, M. (2001) ‘The EU Pre-Accession Strategies: A Political and Legal Analysis’, in Maresceau, 
M. and Lannon, E. (eds.), The EU’s Enlargement and Mediterranean Strategies. A Comparative Analysis, 
Houndmills: Palgrave, p. 21.
28 Court of Justice of the European Union (2005), ‘Case C-265/03’, http://goo.gl/Ur0qg.  
29 Maresceau, M. (2004), ‘Bilateral Agreements concluded by the European Community’, Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, p. 430.
30 See: Van Elsuwege, P. (2008b), From Soviet Republics to EU Member States. A Legal and Political 
Assessment of the Baltic States’ Accession to the EU, Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff , pp. 399–402. 
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any tangible content. Moreover, there is some dissatisfaction with the limited 
eff ectiveness of the large number of meetings and dialogues.31 Particularly after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which transferred the task of preparing 
the bi-annual EU-Russia summits from the six-months rotating EU Presidency to 
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, the added value of such frequent 
meetings is put into question.32 
The limits of the PCA as an instrument for the smooth development of 
EU-Russia relations were clearly illustrated with the Polish meat crisis of 2005–
2007. In the opinion of Poland, Russia’s ban on the import of Polish meat was 
not proportional to the irregularities found and, therefore, infringed Article 19 
of the PCA, which forbids the use of veterinary and phytosanitary restrictions on 
trade between the parties in an arbitrary and unjustifi ed manner.33 Pursuant to 
Article 101 of the PCA, disputes relating to the application or interpretation of the 
agreement may be referred to the Cooperation Council. The latter can, however, 
only adopt recommendations to settle the problems. In case no solution can be 
found, conciliators may be appointed, but their recommendations are not binding 
upon the parties. It is striking that the formal rules of procedure for the settlement 
of disputes under the PCA have not been used or even contemplated in the Polish 
meat row. Only after a change of government in Poland and a visit of the new Polish 
Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski to Moscow, the meat ban and other restrictions 
on Polish products were lifted in December 2007 and January 2008 respectively.34
 In the aftermath of the Polish-Russian food crisis, the EU and Russia 
concluded several Memoranda of Understanding on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures and food safety requirements.35 However, this could not prevent the 
emergence of new trade disputes. In the summer of 2011, Russia banned the import 
of all fresh vegetables from the EU after the discovery of cucumbers with the E.Coli 
bacteria in Germany. The EU Council quickly qualifi ed this reaction as “scientifi cally 
unjustifi ed and disproportionate”.36 In the context of the June 2011 Nizhny 
Novgorod EU-Russia summit, Russia agreed to replace the ban with a temporary 
certifi cation system leading to the cancellation of all import restrictions from 9 
31 Council of the European Union (2011a), ‘Key outstanding issues for the EU in its relations with 
Russia’, 10073/11. 
32 Rettman, A. (2011a) ‘No “deliverables” at upcoming EU-Russia summit’, http://goo.gl/X6jPD. 
33 Council of the European Union (2005), ‘Problems in exports of meat, meat products and plant 
products to the Russian Federation’, 14533/05.
34 Roth, M. (2009), ‘Bilateral Trade Disputes between EU Member States and Russia’, CEPS Working 
Document, no. 319, p. 11.  
35 For a list of relevant documents, see: http://goo.gl/LqQWZ. 
36 Council of the European Union (2011b), ‘Extraordinary Council Meeting Agriculture, Luxembourg’, 
http://goo.gl/kDKMg. 
- 9 -
August 2011 onwards.37 Despite the relatively swift solution of this trade dispute, 
it appears that a problem with meat or vegetables in a single Member State (or a 
limited number of Member States) almost automatically interrupts the entire EU-
Russia trade fl ows. The most recent example is Russia’s decision to ban the import 
of EU cattle, pigs and sheep following the outbreak of the so-called Schmallenberg 
virus in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg and the 
United Kingdom. This decision signifi cantly aff ects the agricultural sector of the 
Baltic States, which send up to 75 per cent of their live pigs exports to Russia.38 Of 
course, this raises speculations about the possible political inspiration of Russia’s 
decision so shortly after the negative Latvian referendum on the use of Russian as 
a state language.
In a joint reaction, European trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht and his 
colleague responsible for health and consumer policy, John Dalli, strongly 
condemned Russia’s reaction as disproportionate and unjustifi ed, particularly in 
light of Russia’s commitments under its WTO accession package. Under the WTO 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, import 
restrictions aimed to protect human, animal or plant life or health have to be based 
on scientifi c evidence, may not arbitrarily or unjustifi ably discriminate between 
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail and cannot be applied in a 
manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.39 In 
the absence of scientifi c evidence that the Schmallenberg virus poses any threat to 
humans and taking into account that pigs, which fall within the ban, are not aff ected 
by the virus, it seems that the Russian decision fails to respect the WTO standards. 
It remains to be seen whether Russia’s WTO accession – and the availability of the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanisms (cf. infra), will be able to solve this issue. In 
any event, the long list of key outstanding issues in EU-Russia relations40 as well as 
the recurrence of often politically motivated trade irritants reveal the limits of the 
PCA in establishing an EU-Russia Strategic Partnership based on the rule of law. 
 
37 ‘Commission welcomes Russia’s decision to cancel temporary import requirements for fresh EU 
vegetables’ (2011), MEMO/11/552, 08.08.2011, http://goo.gl/wTF7l. 
38 Keating, D. (2012), ‘Russia bans live animal imports from the EU’, European Voice, 20.03.2012, 
http://goo.gl/PRu3w. 
39 ‘The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’, Article 3, 
http://goo.gl/BdUzX. 
40 Council of the European Union (2011a), op. cit.. 
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THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD TO A NEW 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
On the occasion of the June 2008 EU-Russia Summit in Khanty-Mansiysk, the leaders 
of the EU and the Russian Federation issued a Joint Statement “on the launch of 
negotiations for a new EU-Russia Agreement”. According to this offi  cial document: 
“[T]he aim is to conclude a strategic agreement that will provide a comprehensive 
framework for EU/Russia relations for the foreseeable future and help to develop 
the potential of our relationship. It should provide for a strengthened legal basis 
and legally binding commitments covering all main areas of the relationship, as 
included in the four EU/Russia common spaces and their road maps which were 
agreed at the Moscow Summit in May 2005”.41
Signifi cantly, the EU and Russia aim to establish the necessary legal instruments 
for the implementation of the Common Spaces road maps, which form the main 
political framework of the Strategic Partnership.42 A key advantage of the Common 
Spaces concept is certainly the fact that, for the fi rst time, the EU and Russia agreed 
upon a joint and comprehensive agenda for future cooperation including a wide 
variety of issues ranging from, among others, the deepening of trade relations and 
energy cooperation to internal and external security, the fi ght against organised 
crime, weapons of mass destruction, migration and asylum, culture and education.43 
The ambition to include all those issues in a bilateral framework agreement raises 
interesting legal questions as regards the division of competences in the EU’s 
internal legal order and the procedural rules to be followed. 
Legal and Procedural Requirements
A fi rst outstanding issue is the internal legal basis of the new agreement. One of 
the options could be to adopt a ‘Strategic Association Agreement’, based on Article 
217 of the TFEU.44 However, the political connotation of ‘association’, suggesting 
41 ‘Joint Statement on the launch of negotiations for a new EU-Russia agreement’ (2008), 
http://goo.gl/S2T2i. [emphasis added]
42 On the concept of Common Spaces in EU-Russia relations, see: Van Elsuwege, P. (2008a), op. cit..
43 For a summary of the scope of issues covered by the four Common Spaces agenda, see: European 
Commission (2007), The European Union and Russia. Close Neighbours, Global Players, Strategic 
Partners, http://goo.gl/qhBjb.
44 Article 217 of the TFEU states that “The Union may conclude, with one or more States or inter-
national organisations, agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedure”. On the suggestion to use this as a legal basis for 
EU-Russia relations, see: Vahl, M. (2004), ‘Whither the Common European Economic Space? Political 
and Institutional Aspects of Closer Economic Integration between the EU and Russia’, in De Wilde 
d’Estmael, T. and Spetschinsky, L. (eds.), La politique étrangère de la Russie et l’Europe. Enjeux d’une 
proximité, Brussels: Peter Lang, p. 178. 
- 11 -
an asymmetrical relationship between the partners, which is based upon a strong 
conditionality approach and the unilateral approximation to EU rules and policies, 
is diffi  cult for Russia to accept politically. For this reason, the 1999 Medium-term 
Strategy explicitly ruled out Russia’s accession to or ‘association’ with the EU.45 
Article 8 of the TEU, introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon, could provide a way 
out of the legal basis discussion.46 According to this provision: 
“1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on 
the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based 
on cooperation.
 2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specifi c agreements 
with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights 
and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their 
implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation.”47
At fi rst sight, Article 8 of the TEU might be an interesting instrument to upgrade the 
PCA without entering into a formal association status. However, the conditionality 
approach and in particular the idea that the relationship is “founded on the values 
of the EU” may not meet Russia’s expectations. Notwithstanding the consensus on 
an abstract set of common values,48 the interpretation of those concepts may be 
diff erent. On several occasions, Putin and Medvedev argued that the principles of 
democracy and liberty must be interpreted in line with Russia’s national values, in 
particular the aspiration to strengthen the statehood and sovereignty of Russia.49 
In a recent opinion, Vladimir Putin once again expressed his general dissatisfaction 
with how the issue of human rights is handled globally and accused the ‘Western 
states’ of ‘dominating’ and ‘politicising’ the human rights agenda to the detriment 
of Russia’s interests.50 
45 See note 5. 
46 Van Elsuwege, P. and Petrov, R. (2012), ‘Article 8 TEU: Towards a New Generation of Agreements 
with the Neighbouring Countries of the European Union?’, European Law Review, vol. 36, no. 5, pp. 
688–703.  
47 Offi  cial Journal of the European Union (2008), ‘Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Unio’, C 115/1. [emphasis added]
48 For instance, the Road Map for the Common Space on External Security explicitly states that “The 
EU and Russia share common values, as defi ned in the Helsinki Final Act as well as in the PCA and 
other relevant international documents notably respect for international law, including respect for 
democratic principles and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, 
equality and respect of mutual interests”.
49 Petrov, R. and Leino, P. (2009), ‘Between “Common Values” and Competing Universals: The Promotion 
of the EU’s Common Values through the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Law Journal, 
vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 667–670.
50 Putin, V. (2011a), ‘Russia and the Changing World’, http://goo.gl/euxrf. (The original article in Russian 
was published in Moskovksiye Novosti.)  
- 12 -
Obviously, the diff erent reading of the events in South Ossetia or Abkhazia 
and the diverging perceptions about the legal position of Russian-speaking 
minorities in Estonia and Latvia signifi cantly aff ect the prospects for a fruitful EU-
Russia cooperation under the terms of Article 8 of the TEU. However, also when the 
new agreement would be based on Article 212 of the TFEU regarding economic, 
fi nancial and technical cooperation with third countries in combination with a 
range of more specifi c legal bases on the other issues included in the agreement 
(e.g. environment, culture, education etc.) or when a more limited agreement on 
trade and investment would be concluded under Article 207 of the TFEU, the EU’s 
position has to be consistent with the principles and objectives of its external action 
as laid down in Article 21 of the TEU.51 Hence, the ‘value’ dimension is a fundamental 
aspect of the EU’s post-Lisbon external action, which cannot be ignored in the 
discussions surrounding the modernisation of EU-Russia legal relations. 
Apart from the sensitivities surrounding the political orientation of the 
new agreement, which is to be refl ected in the choice of legal basis, signifi cant 
procedural hurdles have to be overcome. Arguably, an agreement covering the 
entire spectrum of EU-Russia cooperation requires unanimity in the Council and 
the consent of the European Parliament.52 Moreover, the inclusion of policy areas 
going beyond the EU’s exclusive competences implies that also the Member 
States will have to be involved in the conclusion and ratifi cation procedure of a 
new framework agreement. An important drawback of the mixed procedure is the 
internal ratifi cation of the agreement in all Member States, which becomes a very 
cumbersome and lengthy process in a Union of 27 countries. 
In order to counterbalance the long delays for the implementation of mixed 
agreements, it is common practice to conclude a separate interim agreement on 
trade and trade related matters or to apply provisionally certain provisions of the 
agreement through a separate exchange of letters between the EU and the third 
party.53 Such a scenario where at least the provisions on trade and investment enter 
into force rather quickly may be an interesting option in the short term. Given the 
EU’s extended exclusive competence on common commercial policy (CCP) under 
Article 207 of the TFEU, an interim agreement may be concluded between the EU 
51 According to Article 21 (1) of the TEU, “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided 
by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which 
it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.” [emphasis 
added]
52 See Article 218 of the TFEU for the rules on the conclusion of international agreements on behalf of 
the EU.
53 See: Maresceau, M. (2004), op. cit., pp. 209–210.
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and Russia without the requirement of conclusion and ratifi cation on the part of 
the individual Member States. 
Key outstanding issues: energy and visa 
Russia’s WTO accession signifi cantly facilitates the progress of negotiations on the 
trade aspect of EU-Russia relations. However, diff erences of opinion regarding the 
inclusion of so-called ‘WTO plus’ provisions, allowing for a level of liberalisation and 
legal approximation exceeding the requirements under the WTO agreement, and 
the EU’s intention to include a substantial energy chapter based on the principles 
of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) complicate the negotiations. Given Russia’s 
dissatisfaction with the latter agreement, leading to its withdrawal in 2009 (cf. 
supra), it remains to be seen whether it will be prepared to accept a reintroduction 
of those principles through the back door of a new EU-Russia agreement. Moreover, 
it is no secret that Russia is not very happy with the EU’s Third Energy Package, 
which requires the eff ective separation between the operation of electricity and 
gas transmission networks from supply and production activities of vertically 
integrated energy companies.54 Signifi cantly, undertakings from third countries, 
which intend to acquire control over an electricity or gas network, need to comply 
with the same unbundling requirements as EU undertakings. If they do not comply 
with these requirements, they should be refused the certifi cation, which is required 
for distribution system operators.55 This, of course, has signifi cant implications for 
Gazprom, which faces a legal obligation to ‘unbundle’ the ownership and operation 
of its gas pipelines on EU territory and to allow access to these pipelines to other 
energy companies. Vladimir Putin described this requirement as ‘robbery’ and 
‘confi scation of Russian property’ and announced that Russia would take the 
necessary steps to challenge the validity of the EU energy legislation.56 
In Russia’s view, the Third Energy Package is contrary to Article 34 (1) PCA, which 
spells out that the parties shall use their best endeavours to prevent a deterioration 
of the market conditions under which their respective companies operate.57 In 
addition, Moscow announced to raise the issue in the WTO after its accession to this 
54 See: European Commission (2012), ‘Third package for Electricity & Gas markets’, 
http://goo.gl/OSDX5.
55 This follows from Article 11 (also known as the ‘Gazprom clause’) of Directive 2009/73 of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, Offi  cial Journal of the European 
Union (2009a), L 211/94; a similar clause is included in Directive 2009/72 regarding the internal 
market in electricity, Offi  cial Journal of the European Union (2009b), L 211/54. 
56 Rettman, A. (2011 b), ‘Putin and Barroso in public scrap on EU energy law’, EU Observer, 24.02.2011, 
http://goo.gl/Jw51T.  
57 Transcript of Press Conference between Vladimir Putin and José Manuel Barroso in February 2011, 
http://goo.gl/nuVye. 
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organisation.58 The ‘Gazprom clause’ raises questions of compatibility with diff erent 
provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) such as the Most 
Favourite Nation Principle (Art. II GATS), the prohibition of market access barriers 
(Art. XVI GATS) and the national treatment obligation (Article XVII of GATS).59 
Finally, Russia may invoke investment protection clauses included in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) concluded with certain EU Member States. Particularly 
for the new Member States, those agreements have been concluded before their 
accession to the Union and, therefore, potentially escape the application of EU 
law in accordance with Article 351 (1) of the TFEU, which states that international 
agreements concluded by EU Member States before their accession to the Union 
shall not be aff ected by the provisions of the EU Treaties.60 Taking into account the 
high stakes, both in terms of fi nancial and strategic interests, the importance of 
this energy battle can hardly be underestimated. As Katinka Barysch observed, the 
energy dispute “is likely to keep EU judges and competition offi  cials busy for years 
to come”.61
Another issue that is expected to remain at the centre of EU-Russia discussions 
is certainly the prospect of a visa free regime. On the occasion of the December 
2011 EU-Russia summit, both partners agreed on concrete steps to facilitate 
the mobility of citizens.62 The introduction of biometric passports and increased 
eff orts to combat illegal immigration and improve border management prepare 
the ground for visa-free short travel in the future. However, so far the EU has been 
reluctant to communicate a clear target date for the lifting of the visa requirement. 
Several EU Member States fear the risks of excessive immigration and organised 
crime. The conclusion of Europol’s Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) that 
visa liberalisation with Russia “may lead to widespread abuse” would “undoubtedly 
present new opportunities for organised crime groups in illegal immigration” 
58 PeakOil.com (2011), ‘Russia may contest EU energy rules in WTO’, http://goo.gl/UiMrR. 
59 For an analysis, see: Van Hoorn, V. (2009), ‘Unbundling, Reciprocity and the European Internal 
Energy Markets: WTO Consistency and Broader Implications for Europe’, European Energy and 
Environmental Law Review, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 51–76; Cottier, T., Matteotti-Bertukova, S. and Nartova, 
O. (2010), ‘Third Country Relations in EU Unbundling of Natural Gas Markets: The ‘Gazprom clause’ 
of Directive 2009/97 EC and WTO law’, NCCR Trade Regulation, http://goo.gl/Ut1Yu. 
60 A interesting precedent of such a situation is the preferential market access granted to the Swiss 
energy company ATEL, which is regarded as an investment protected under the 1990 bilateral 
agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. Even 
though this preferential treatment is not compliant with EU Directive 2003/54 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity, the European Court of Justice considered that EU law 
could not apply by virtue of Article 351 (1) TFEU. See: Court of Justice of the European Union, Case 
C-264/09, Commission v. Slovakia, Judgment of 15 September 2011, not yet reported. For comments, 
see: Boute, A. (2012), case note on Case C-264/09, Common Market Law Review, forthcoming. 
61 Barysch, K. (2011), ‘The EU and Russia: All smiles and no action?’, Centre for European Reform Policy 
Brief, http://goo.gl/JKbMx.  
62 European Council (2011), ‘EU-Russia Summit to improve citizen’s mobility’, http://goo.gl/8lIio. 
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support this position.63 Nevertheless, the prospect of visa freedom remains a key 
priority for Russia and further progress in this fi eld, for instance on the basis of a 
more concrete action plan or the negotiation of a specifi c visa waiver agreement, 
may be required to reconcile both parties’ positions. 
RUSSIA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO: 
A MODERNISATION OF EU-RUSSIA TRADE RELATIONS
In anticipation of a new framework agreement, Russia’s WTO accession already 
entails a signifi cant modernisation of EU-Russia legal relations, at least as far as 
the trade dimension is concerned. Without entering into a detailed analysis, six 
important implications can be identifi ed. 
First, Russia’s WTO accession package entails clear-cut commitments on further 
trade liberalisation leading to a more transparent and predictable environment for 
trade and foreign investment. On average, the legally binding ceiling for import 
duties on goods will be reduced to 7.8 per cent, compared to a pre-accession 
average of 10 per cent; for agricultural products there will be an average reduction 
from 13.2 per cent to 10.8 per cent.64 Signifi cantly, Russia’s ‘temporary’ anti-crisis 
measures adopted since 2008 and including tariff  increases on a wide range 
of products will be abolished. Those measures had a very negative impact on 
EU exports, particularly after their extension to the Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus 
customs union in 2010. Despite the Union’s argument that this unannounced 
increase violated Article 16 of the PCA, which explicitly requires prior consultations 
within the Cooperation Committee before changes to import tariff  policies are 
introduced, it is only in the context of Russia’s WTO accession that a solution to the 
tariff  increases could be found. 
Apart from the lowering of import tariff s, the WTO accession package also fi xes 
export duties for over 700 tariff  lines, including sectors such as fi sheries, mineral 
fuels and wood.65 The latter is of particular importance for the EU, certainly for 
its Nordic Member States which are major importers of Russian wood products. 
Since 2007, Russia has introduced several new export duties on raw timber, 
offi  cially to accelerate the restructuring of the Russian wood and paper industry 
and to address environmental concerns, but for the EU, this practice constitutes an 
indirect subsidy to domestic downstream users. 66 Russia’s WTO accession will end 
63 Europol (2011), OCTA 2011. EU Organized Crime Threat Assessment, http://goo.gl/KPTkf. 
64 WTO (2011), ‘Working Party seals the deal on Russia’s membership negotiations’, 10.11.2011, 
http://goo.gl/ihov6. 
65 See: Part V of Russia’s Schedule of Concessions and Commitments. 
66 Forsberg, T. and. Seppo, A. (2009), ‘Power without Infl uence? The EU and Trade Disputes with Russia’, 
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this practice and increase the legal certainty for trade in wood products. In addition 
to the WTO commitments on reduced export tariff s, the EU and Russia concluded 
an agreement, in the form of an exchange of letters, relating to the administration 
of tariff -rate quotas applying to exports of wood from Russia to the EU.67 Hence, 
a transparent system of quota allocations to EU importers, administered by the 
European Commission in cooperation with the Russian customs authorities, aims 
to avoid the speculative trading of tariff  quota entitlements. 
In order to reduce the risk of new export duties being introduced or increased 
in the future, the EU and Russia concluded a supplementary agreement concerning 
trade in raw materials which are not covered under Russia’s WTO Schedule of 
Concessions and Commitments on Goods.68 This agreement, also concluded in the 
form of an exchange of letters, provides that the Russian Federation “shall make its 
best eff orts not to introduce or increase export duties” for a list of raw materials that 
are included in an annex to the letters. This more than 20 pages long list, including 
materials ranging from green tea and tobacco to liquefi ed natural gas and 
petroleum oils, includes products “for which Russia has more than 10% of global 
production or exports, or where the EU has major import interest either existing 
or potential, or where there is a risk of tension in global supplies”.69 Apart from the 
intention not to introduce or increase the export duties on those products, Russia 
also commits to hold consultations with the European Commission at least two 
months before such measures would nevertheless be contemplated. Even though 
this supplementary bilateral agreement between the EU and Russia does not entail 
hard legal commitments, it nevertheless reveals an engagement to improve the 
stability and predictability of the bilateral trade relations. 
Second, apart from new legal commitments on improved market access for 
goods and services, the perspective of Russia’s WTO accession also triggered a 
solution to long-standing trade irritants. For instance, following the WTO principle 
of national treatment, the Russian system of tariff s for rail freight transport can no 
longer discriminate between domestic and international destinations. A similar 
reasoning applies regarding the use of discriminatory road charges on good 
vehicles.70 Of particular signifi cance is certainly the solution to the issue of Siberian 
overfl ight rights. As a heritage from the Soviet period, EU air carriers fl ying over 
Siberia to destinations in Asia have to pay an overfl ight fee which costs around € 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 61, no. 10, p. 1816. 
67 Offi  cial Journal of the European Union (2012a), L 57/3, http://goo.gl/njvCv.  
68 Offi  cial Journal of the European Union (2012b), L 57/53, http://goo.gl/8fKn4.   
69 Ibid.  
70 Council of the European Union (2011a), op. cit.
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330 million a year, mostly to the benefi t of Aerofl ot.71 For a long time, the EU has 
argued that this practice is violating international law, more specifi cally Article 15 of 
the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation,72 as well as EU competition 
rules. An agreement to gradually eliminate the charge of Siberian overfl ight rights 
was initialled between the Commission and the Russian government in November 
2006 as part of the EU’s bilateral negotiations on Russia’s WTO accession. However, 
the Russian side refused to proceed with the conclusion of the agreement until 
the entire WTO accession negotiation process was fi nished. This explains why the 
2006 agreement only entered into force in 2012, leading to the gradual reduction 
of payments and their abolishment from 2014 onwards.  
An additional problem regarding air transport concerns Russia’s long-term 
refusal to accept so-called ‘EU designation clauses’ in its bilateral Air Service 
Agreements (ASAs) with individual EU Member States. Such clauses provide that 
benefi ts granted to national carriers of the Member State concerned are equally 
granted to all EU carriers.73 The absence of such an EU designation clause has 
created serious practical problems, for instance, following the takeover of Austrian 
Airlines by Lufthansa. Russia started to argue that fl ights operated by Austrian 
Airlines would no longer fall under the Russian-Austrian ASA, which created legal 
uncertainty as to whether Austrian Airlines could continue its operations over 
Russian territory.74 Similar problems occurred after the merger of Iberia and British 
Airways or the takeover of Belgian Brussels Airlines by Lufhansa. In order to solve 
this issue, the European Commission launched infringement procedures against 
several Member States and raised the issue on the occasion of the October 2011 
EU-Russia aviation summit. Russia has recently for the fi rst time accepted the 
introduction of an EU designation clause in its bilateral ASA with Finland, which 
could become a template for its bilateral ASAs with all other EU Member States.75 
71 Forsberg, T. and Seppo, A (2009), op. cit., p. 1810. 
72 According to this provision “no charge shall be imposed by any Contracting Party solely for 
the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of the Contracting 
Party or persons or property thereon”. See: ‘Convention on International Civil Aviation’ (1944), 
http://goo.gl/tpphB.  
73 The obligation for EU Member States to include an ‘EU designation clause’ in their bilateral aviation 
agreements follows from the Open Skies judgments where the Court found that national clauses 
in aviation agreements restricting international traffi  c rights to nationals carries infringed the EU 
Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment. See e.g. Court of Justice of the European Union 
(2002), ‘Case C-466/98’, I-9427, http://goo.gl/ciDB2.  
74 European Commission (2011b), ‘Air transport: Infringements concerning bilateral aviation 
agreements with Russia’, MEMO/11/167, 14.03.2011, http://goo.gl/lX84U. 
75 ‘EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress Report 2010’, http://goo.gl/zNDmq. 
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In the longer run, the conclusion of a horizontal EU-Russia air transport agreement 
could be a logical next step in the modernisation process.76
Third, Russia’s WTO accession also provides a minimum legal framework for EU-
Russia energy relations. Despite the absence of specifi c WTO agreements on energy, 
general WTO rules such as the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment 
(NT) principles also apply to trade in energy goods and services.77 One of the 
most controversial issues is the WTO compatibility of Russia’s dual pricing policy 
for energy. While domestic gas prices are set by the government at a level that 
is considered reasonable for domestic consumers, export prices are established 
on the basis of supply and demand in the importing country. This discrepancy in 
energy prices may be regarded as an unfair competitive advantage for Russian 
industrial producers and exporters benefi tting from state subsidies. Hence, the 
question arises whether this practice is in line with WTO law, in particular with the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). 
Only subsidies that are specifi c to an enterprise or industry, a group of 
enterprises of industries or a region are actionable under WTO rules. Signifi cantly, 
Article 2 of the SCM Agreement prohibits not only de jure but also de facto specifi c 
subsidies. In order to establish whether this is the case, several factors are taken 
into account such as the number of enterprises that receive a subsidy, predominant 
use by certain enterprises, disproportionately large subsidies to certain enterprises 
and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in 
the decision to grant a subsidy. Taking into account that Russian domestic energy 
prices apply to all enterprises and industries throughout the country, it appears 
very diffi  cult to prove that those conditions of selectivity are fulfi lled.78 
In contrast to Saudi Arabia, which agreed to abandon its dual pricing system 
as part of its WTO accession package, Russia did not want to give in on this point. 
There is only a commitment to gradually increase the domestic gas prices and 
to determine those prices “on the basis of normal commercial considerations, 
based on recovery of costs and profi t”.79 In addition, price controls on domestic 
76 It is noteworthy that already in 2005, the European Commission proposed such a “comprehensive 
air transport agreement”, see: European Commission (2005), ‘A Framework for Developing 
Relations with the Russian Federation in the fi eld of Air Transport’, COM(2005) 77 fi nal, 14.03.2005, 
http://goo.gl/Kpoyi. 
77 Marceau, G. (2010), ‘The WTO in the Emerging Energy Governance Debate’, Global Trade and Customs 
Journal, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 83–93. 
78 Ripinsky, S. (2004), ‘The System of Gas Dual Pricing in Russia: Compatibility with WTO Rules’, 
World Trade Review, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 463; Silovanova, Y. (2007), ‘The WTO and Energy. WTO Rules 
and Agreements of Relevance to the Energy Sector’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, p. 30.   
79 ‘Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade 
Organization’ (2011), WT/ACC/RUS/70, 17.11.2011, para. 132, http://goo.gl/8mfem.   
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gas are to be transparent and not to be used for purposes of protecting domestic 
products. Under those circumstances, the system of dual energy pricing is as such 
not precluded after Russia’s WTO accession. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded 
that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body will be asked to verify the compatibility of 
Russia’s energy policy with its commitments under WTO law. 
Fourth, the new legal context will also have signifi cant implications for the EU’s 
trade policy. For instance, it will no longer be possible to apply import quotas 
for Russian steel.80 Moreover, it may become more diffi  cult to use trade defence 
instruments. Although Russia has been granted market economy status already 
in 2002, the EU has so far applied ‘energy adjustment costs’ in the application of 
its anti-dumping policies vis-à-vis Russia.81 In practical terms, this means that in 
order to determine whether a given Russian company’s products are dumped on 
the EU market, i.e. sold under a price that is considered to be their normal value, 
not the domestic Russian energy costs, but a reference price from other markets 
is used as the point of reference. The direct consequence is that the dumping 
margin attributed to Russian products and the anti-dumping duties imposed on 
this basis are higher than if the actual Russian production price would be taken into 
account. Following Russia’s WTO accession it may be diffi  cult to argue that Russian 
domestic prices are kept artifi cially low, since they will be considered to be based 
on commercial grounds (cf. supra).
 Fifth, Russia’s WTO accession is expected to improve the level of protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPR). Under Article 54 and Annex 10 of the PCA, Russia 
agreed to establish a protection regime for IPR which is “similar to that existing in 
the EU”. However, such standards have not been implemented yet, as evidenced 
by the annual US Trade Representative report on intellectual property protection 
in third states.82 The application of the WTO agreement on Trade Related aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides an additional legal basis and a further 
incentive to modernise Russia’s IPR legislation. Similar improvements are expected 
80 European Commission (2011c), ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1342/2007 on administering certain restrictions 
on imports of certain steel imports from the Russian Federation’, COM(2011) 715 fi nal, 
http://goo.gl/7ONHN. 
81 Article 2 of the EU’s basic anti-dumping Regulation 1225/2009 (Offi  cial Journal of the European 
Union (2009c), L343/51.) provides that the normal value of a product can be calculated on the basis 
of the cost of production or on the basis of representative export prices and information from other 
markets – instead of the domestic price of the exporting country – when prices are considered 
artifi cially low. This rule signifi cantly reduced the impact of Russia’s recognition of a market 
economy. See: Engelbutzeder, O. (2004), EU Anti-Dumping Measures against Russian Exporters In 
View of Russian Accession to the WTO and the EU Enlargement 2004, Berlin: Peter Lang, pp. 166–167.  
82 Due to serious problems regarding the enforcement of intellectual property legislation, Russia is on 
the ‘priority watch list’ of countries with a weak system of legal protection. See: Offi  ce of the United 
States Trade Representative (2011), ‘2011 Special 301 Report’, http://goo.gl/FbvCP. 
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with regard to foreign investment protection. In recent years, foreign investors 
regularly faced problems particularly in the strategic oil and gas sectors. A well-
known example is the forced transfer of assets from Dutch Shell to Gazprom for the 
exploitation of the Shakalin II project in 2006.83 It is expected that the application 
of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) will avoid 
such scenarios in the future.
Sixth, Russia’s WTO accession implies that future trade disputes with the EU will 
fall under the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. This rather sophisticated 
mechanism involves diff erent stages starting with consultations between the 
parties and potentially leading to adjudication by expert panels and the Appellate 
Body. Alternatively, disputes can be solved on the basis of arbitration, conciliation 
or mediation.84 Notwithstanding the limits of this system, such as the sometimes 
time-consuming and cumbersome procedures or the lack of direct eff ect in 
the domestic legal order of most WTO members, the authority of WTO dispute 
settlement rulings cannot be underestimated. In this respect, it is noteworthy that 
China, a country which has traditionally been reluctant to submit its disputes with 
other countries to international adjudication, has become an active participant in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings.85 It remains to be seen whether Russia will 
follow a similar path, but the availability of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
is in any event a signifi cant improvement in comparison to the rather weak 
procedures under the PCA (cf. supra). 
THE WAY FORWARD: FREE TRADE FROM LISBON TO VLADIVOSTOK? 
Russia’s WTO accession could, in principle, open the gates to the negotiation of a 
free trade agreement with the EU as provided under Article 3 of the PCA (cf. supra). 
However, such an option is highly uncertain following Russia’s economic integration 
initiatives in the post-Soviet space. In particular, the existence of a customs union 
between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in the context of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC) and Vladimir Putin’s recent proposals on the development 
of a Eurasian Union constitute signifi cant legal and political obstacles for the 
realisation of this scenario. 
83 See: Euractiv.com (2006), ‘EU voices anger over Russia’s move to halt Sakhalin project’, 20.09.2006, 
http://goo.gl/PiRyn. 
84 For a detailed overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, see: Van Den Bossche, P. (2008), 
The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Cambridge: CUP, pp. 269–307. 
85 Manjiao, C. (2012), “China’s Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement over the Past Decade: 
Experiences and Impacts”, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 29–49.  
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Even though the EU formally supports the process of regional cooperation 
between the countries of the former Soviet Union,86 a level of trade integration 
leading to a common customs territory precludes the prospects for bilateral trade 
liberalisation in the relations between the EU and Russia. The only alternative option 
is to enter into a free trade arrangement with the customs union as a whole but 
this is not very attractive for the EU taking into account the economic and political 
situation in Belarus and Kazakhstan. Entering into free trade negotiations with the 
authoritarian regimes of Nazarbayev and Lukashenko would be contradictory to 
the conditionality approach underlying the EU’s external action. Moreover, both 
countries are not members of the WTO, which has always been a precondition for 
the Union to even contemplate the start of free trade negotiations. 
It is remarkable that those considerations do not play a role for the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA). Although a bilateral FTA was fi rst envisaged between 
only Russia and the EFTA States, the negotiations have been expanded to include 
Belarus and Kazakhstan after the formation of the EurAsEC customs union.87 
Russian attempts for follow a similar path in its negotiations with the EU have so far 
been unsuccessful and it is unlikely that the EU’s position on this issue will change. 
On the other hand, Russia does not seem prepared to abandon its close links with 
Belarus and Kazakhstan. To the contrary, on several occasions Vladimir Putin has 
indicated that further regional trade integration is a political priority for Russia. 
Apart from Russia’s renewed interest in the establishment of a free trade area 
within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),88 Putin launched the 
idea to develop the Belarusian-Kazakh-Russian customs union into a full-fl edged 
Eurasian Union, including all republics of the former Soviet Union and leading to 
a single currency, common institutions and a passport-free zone in the future. In 
Putin’s view, the future Eurasian Union will then enter into negotiations with the 
EU to set up “a harmonised community of economies stretching from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok, a free trade zone and even more sophisticated integration patterns”.89 
This project may sound attractive, but cannot conceal a number of practical 
problems. First, there is a lack of trust among the post-Soviet states, which has 
86 This is explicitly recognised in the preamble to the PCA. 
87 The negotiations between the four EFTA States and the three members of the Customs Union have 
been launched on 23 November 2010. See: http://goo.gl/u3Z7d.  
88 In autumn 2011, Russia took the initiative to sign a new CIS FTA after it had refused to ratify a similar 
agreement from 1994. The new agreement was signed on October 18, 2011 by eight CIS members, 
including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan. Russia 
was the fi rst to conclude the ratifi cation process on 1 April 2012, followed by Belarus a few weeks 
later. The agreement will enter into force following the ratifi cation of three signatories. 
89 Putin, V. (2011b), ’A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the making’, 04.10.2011, 
http://goo.gl/vkh4z. 
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prevented the successful implementation of previous attempts of regional 
integration.90 Second, Putin’s proposal may essentially be regarded as an attempt 
to counterbalance the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative. This policy framework, 
which was launched shortly after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war as part of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), aims at the political association and 
economic integration of the eastern neighbours.91 In this context, the EU and 
Ukraine recently initialled a new Association Agreement, including the prospective 
establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The formal 
conclusion of this agreement would preclude Ukraine’s participation in any kind of 
regional integration project with Russia going beyond free trade. If, on the other 
hand, Ukraine would decide to enter the EurAsEC customs union, it will have to 
abandon its free trade arrangement with the EU.92 
In other words, both the EU and Russia have a fundamentally diff erent vision 
on the development of their shared neighbourhood. For the Union, the creation 
of a DCFTA with Ukraine is a crucial fi rst step towards a Neighbourhood Economic 
Community, i.e. a free trade area encompassing the EU Member States and its 
neighbours based upon a common regulatory framework defi ned by EU standards 
and norms. For Russia, the priority is the expansion of the EurAsEC customs union 
as a building block of a future Eurasian Union. The success of this project also stands 
or falls with the participation of Ukraine. Hence, despite the rhetoric of ‘free trade 
from Lisbon to Vladivostok’ and the ambition to create a ‘common economic space’ 
between the EU and Russia, incompatibilities between the ENP inspired process of 
economic integration and Russian initiatives to reintegrate the post-Soviet space 
loom around the corner. Legal and political frictions regarding the position of 
Ukraine or the EurAsEC customs union risk to undermine the modernisation of EU-
Russia relations and complicate the progress of negotiations on a new framework 
agreement. 
90 See e.g. Shadikhodjaev, S. (2009), ‘Trade Integration in the CIS Region: A Thorny Path Towards a 
Customs Union’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 555–578.   
91 Lannon, E. and. Van Elsuwege, P. (2012), ‘The Eastern Partnership. Prospects of a New Regional Dimen-
sion within the European Neighbourhood Policy’, in Lannon, E. (ed.), The European Neighbourhood 
Policy’s Challenges, Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 285–322.  
92 Van der Loo, G. and Van Elsuwege, P. (2012), ‘Competing Paths of Regional Economic Integration in 
the Post-Soviet Space: Legal and Political Dilemmas for Ukraine’, Review of Central and East European 
Law, forthcoming. 
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CONCLUSIONS
Both within the EU and in Russia there is a consensus that the legal framework 
of their bilateral relationship needs modernisation. The PCA refl ects the spirit of 
the early 1990s, but does not seem adapted to the new challenges of the 21st 
century. The weak dispute settlement mechanism, the impossibility to adopt 
legally binding decisions and the absence of formal legal provisions on issues such 
as energy and migration are the most obvious examples. Even though this has 
been partially solved through the conclusion of specifi c bilateral agreements and 
Russia’s accession to the WTO, an updated bilateral framework agreement remains 
important for reasons of legal certainty and to ensure that the Strategic Partnership 
is based on a solid institutional structure.93 However, several issues complicate the 
negotiations that started back in 2008. 
First, both partners have diff erent perceptions on the interpretation of 
fundamental values such as respect for the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights. The European Parliament’s strong condemnation of the irregularities 
in the preparation and conduct of the recent parliamentary and presidential 
elections94 as well as European Council President Van Rompuy’s open letter to 
outgoing Russian President Dimitry Medvedev regarding the lack of progress 
in the investigation of the murder on Sergey Magnitsky95 illustrate the Union’s 
concerns. Given the importance attached to the export of EU values in the Treaty 
of Lisbon, it is impossible to escape this issue in the context of EU-Russia relations. 
This is particularly the case because the European Parliament, which is traditionally 
more sensitive to human rights issues, has become a more active actor in the EU’s 
external action. Moreover, Russia’s complicated bilateral relationship with certain 
EU Member States implies that the conclusion and ratifi cation of a new agreement 
promises to be a diffi  cult and long-term exercise. 
Second, energy is not surprisingly a hot issue in EU-Russia relations. More than 
30 per cent of all EU energy imports come from Russia whereas the Union is by far 
Russia’s most important trading partner in energy goods. Between 70 and 80 per 
cent of all Russian gas and oil exports are destined for the EU market.96 Despite the 
obvious mutual interdependence, both partners have diff erent strategic interests 
leading to opposing views on the preferred legal framework. For Russia, ‘security 
93 Van Elsuwege, P. (2009), ‘Towards a New Strategic Partnership Agreement: EU-Russia Relations at 
the Crossroads’, http://goo.gl/ec7Jt.  
94 European Parliament (2012), Resolution on the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia, 
P7_TA(2012)0088, http://goo.gl/XGDGr. 
95 See: Rettman, A. (2012), “EU President: Magnitsky case ‘emblematic’ for Russia”, EU Observer, 
20.04.2012, http://goo.gl/4Xr1m.  
96 European Commission (2012b), ‘EU-Russia Energy Relations’, http://goo.gl/99BYh. 
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of demand’ is crucial. Therefore, a market structure with vertically integrated gas 
companies operating on the basis of long-term contracts and delivering gas through 
their own pipelines with no freedom of access to other suppliers is in Russia’s 
interest. This ‘Gazprom strategy’ is at the core of Russia’s energy policy. For the EU, 
however, ‘security of supply’ is a key concern and for this reason a diversifi cation 
of suppliers is essential. This explains the requirement of ‘unbundling’ in the EU’s 
Third Energy Package and the increased attention to alternative sources such as 
liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) and other ‘unconventional’ gas. Obviously, the legal 
requirements following from the Third Energy Package are diffi  cult to reconcile with 
the Gazprom strategy. Pipeline politics and Russia’s dual energy pricing mechanism 
further complicate the energy discussions. 
Third, Vladimir Putin may be right when he assessed that “a genuine partnership 
between Russia and the European Union is impossible as long as there are barriers 
that impede human and economic contacts, fi rst and foremost visa requirements”.97 
However, there is a widespread fear within the Union that an abolishment of the 
visa requirement would increase migratory pressures and organised crime. Despite 
the adoption of Common Steps towards visa free short travel for Russian and EU 
citizens, there seems not much appetite within the Union to discuss a full-fl edged 
visa waiver agreement. 
Fourth, there is a risk of clashing neighbourhood strategies. Putin’s proposals 
on the establishment of a Eurasian union and the sometimes subtle pressure on 
countries such as Ukraine and – to a lesser extent – Moldova to join the EurAsEC 
customs union irritate the European Union policy makers. Such scenarios 
undermine the ENP, which is based on a strong conditionality approach, legal 
approximation and the establishment of bilateral DCFTAs. A further intensifi cation 
of regional economic integration in the post-Soviet space based upon the already 
existing EurAsEC customs union signifi cantly limits the EU’s abilities to infl uence 
the domestic legal framework of the countries concerned. 
The connecting factor between all identifi ed problem areas (values, energy, visa, 
neighbourhood relations) is a lack of trust between the parties. In this context, the 
negotiation of a new framework agreement is a very diffi  cult exercise. Moreover, 
the ratifi cation process may take several additional years. In the meantime, the 
modernisation of EU-Russia legal relations takes place in a piecemeal fashion and 
remains a work in progress. 
97 Putin, V. (2011a), op. cit.
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